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Abstract. ‘Legal storytelling’ is one of the most contested area of the interdisciplinary research field of ‘law and 
literature’, which has taken shape in the political and legal context of the United States originally. The proponents 
of ‘legal storytelling’ endeavour to ‘give voice’ to groups and minorities of disadvantageous social position by 
‘telling’ – by hearing and publicizing, in fact – their stories unheard by law. However, many lawyers doubt that 
these everyday life, often trivial, stories carry any legally relevant content, while literati question their aesthetical 
value. The essay argues against these doubts leaning on the material of focus group interviews recorded in a recent 
research on the Hungarians’ legal consciousness. It aims to expose the important role that these everyday life 
stories play in legal culture on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that the analysis of these uncanonised, not-
belletristic texts could be fruitful indeed. For this, the first part of the essay offers a survey on how the concept of 
‘legal culture’ emerged in Hungarian legal theoretical thinking, and how the sociological researches, in which the 
presented ordinary stories were recorded, connected to that. After analysing several story-bits taken from two focus 
group participants’ narrations, the attention turns to stories told by the ‘greats’, that is by writers, and here enters 
Franz Kafka in the scope. The last part of the essay seeks to determine what relates the two kinds – the ordinary 
and the literary – of narratives and what are the differences between them. For a conclusion, it emphasizes that 
this essay can be seen only as an intuitive theoretical experience for using aesthetic notions in analysing empirical 
sociological data rather than a methodologically well-founded application of that. The basic idea of this experiment 
is that both law and aesthetics are permeated by moral, and social psychological constituents. 
 





The headline of this study is slightly misleading perhaps. For we would associate it with Karel 
Čapek’s work,1 although we shall bring into play one of his compatriot’s2 – highly ranked in 
the canon of ‘law and literature’ –, Franz Kafka’s aesthetics in the following analysis. 
 As for ‘legal storytelling’, it is one of the most contested area of the interdisciplinary 
research field of ‘law and literature’, and has taken shape in the political and legal context of 
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the United States originally. The proponents of ‘legal storytelling’ endeavour to ‘give voice’ to 
groups and minorities of disadvantageous social position by ‘telling’ – by hearing and 
publicizing, in fact – their stories unheard by law.3 However, many lawyers doubt that these 
everyday life, often trivial, stories carry any legally relevant content,4 while literati question 
their aesthetical value.5 
 The present essay argues against these doubts leaning on the material of focus group 
interviews recorded in a recent research on the Hungarians’ legal consciousness. It aims to 
expose the important role that these everyday life stories play in legal culture on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, that the analysis of these uncanonised, not-belletristic texts could be 
fruitful indeed. Mainly here, in Hungary, southeast from Kafka. 
 For this, the first part of the essay offers a survey on how the concept of ‘legal culture’ 
emerged in Hungarian legal theoretical thinking, and how the sociological researches, in which 
the presented ordinary stories recorded, connected to that. After analysing several story-bits 
taken from two focus group participants’ narrations, the attention turns on stories told by the 
‘greats’, that is by writers, and here enters Kafka in the scope, of course. The last part of the 
study seeks to determine what relates the two kinds – the ordinary and the belletristic – of 
narratives and what are the differences between them.         
  
2. Aspects of legal culture and research in legal consciousness 
 
The concept of ‘legal culture’ has appeared on the horizon of Hungarian theoretical legal 
thinking in the 1990s, first in legal history then in comparative law,6 though the cultural 
approach to law had been already present more than a century before in legal ethnology and 
anthropology on the international scholarly scene.7 The cause of this delay should be sought, of 
course, in the five-decade-long enforced dominance of Marxism over Hungarian social 
sciences. With respect to the legal consciousness researches that have begun in the middle of 
1960s,8 this meant that – fitting in the peculiar theoretical framework of ‘socialist jurisprudence’ 
– the notions of ‘social level legal consciousness’ or ‘social legal consciousness’ took over the 
                                                             
3 For a program-setting article, see Richard DELGADO: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others. A Plea for 
Narrative. Michigan Law Review 87 (1989) 8, 2411–2441. For a critical introduction of the trend to the Hungarian 
legal scholarship, see Tamás NAGY: Narratív tematika a kortárs amerikai jogelméletben. [Narrative thematic in 
the contemporary American legal theory]. In Tamás NAGY: Josef K. nyomában. Jogról és irodalomról [In the trail 
of Josef K. About law and literature] Máribesnyő-Gödöllő, Attraktor, 2010. 125–160. 
4 As Richard Posner observes on the radical feminist Cathrine MacKinnon’s anti-pornographic writings: 
‘MacKinnon is a magnet for the unhappy stories of prostitutes, rape victims, and pornographic models and 
actresses. Even if all these stories are true (though how many are exaggerated? Does MacKinnon know?), their 
frequency is an essential issue in deciding what if anything the law should try to do about the sufferings that the 
stories narrate.’ Richard POSNER: Legal Narratology. 64 University of Chicago Law Review (1997) 2, 737–747, 
744. 
5 Tamás Nagy – agreeing with Posner – points out that the narrated ‘legal stories’ often lack the cathartic effect 
needed to overcome the prejudices of the audience. As Posner a bit coarsely puts it: ‘The question is the audience 
for this scholarship and the sensitive issue of narrative skills of the stories’ authors. You need considerable literary 
skill to write a story that will effectively challenge a reader’s preconceptions. People read junk that does not 
challenge their preconceptions; they do not read junk that does challenge them.’ POSNER: ibid, 743.     
6 István H. SZILÁGYI: Adalékok a jogi kultúra fogalmához. [Further thoughts on the concept of legal culture] In: 
Teodóra NAGY-JANKA (ed.): A jogi kultúrtörténet és a jogi néprajz új forrásai. [New sources of legal cultural 
history and legal ethnography] I. Szekszárd, Pécsi Tudományegyetem Kultúrtörténeti, Pedagógusképző és 
Vidékfejlesztési Kar, 2018. 109–124. 
7 Cf. István H. SZILÁGYI: Let Us Invent the Hungarian Legal Anthropology. 33 Rechtstheorie (2002) 2−4, 
187−196. 
8 About the history of the Hungarian legal consciousness studies in the socialist area, see Balázs FEKETE – István 
H. SZILÁGYI: Knowledge and Opinion about Law (KOL) Research in Hungary. 58 Acta Juridica Hungarica. 
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, (2017) 3, 326–358. 
place of ‘legal culture’. Since the concept and theoretical perspective of ‘socialist 
jurisprudence’ stayed alive more or less without any critical reflection in the last decade of the 
past century, so they still have influence on the contemporary legal sociology.9 The critical 
review of this intellectual heritage has begun only recently10 parallel with the increasing interest 
in the cultural approach to the legal phenomena. 
 The most trivial argument – although it has far-reaching methodological consequences 
– for replacing ‘social legal consciousness’ with ‘legal culture’, a more suitable concept for 
operationalisation in socio-legal studies, is that the former presuppose a kind of ‘collective 
personality’ (like Marxist ‘class consciousness’), which is pointless from an empirical point of 
view. For only an individual person has consciousness in proper psychological terms, and all 
those socially given (and sensually ungraspable) ‘thoughts’ or ‘ideas’ appearing to her 
externally in a more or less objectified form belong to the realm of culture. 
 For our present purposes, the concept of legal culture can be defined as a set of values, 
norms, symbols, narratives, and patterns of social practices. Legal culture is related to political 
culture through the concept of legitimacy, and it is organically woven into the texture of the 
entire culture without sharp contours anyway. 
 Furthermore, we have to divide the sphere of ‘laic’ and ‘professional’ culture within the 
realm of legal culture. The maintenance of the latter is the function – and monopoly, in fact – 
of legal profession attending to the normative layer of legal culture, and working out the 
adhering doctrinal-dogmatic layer. The ‘professional legal culture’ has evidently the 
determining importance in the formation of legal culture as whole. Although it is also clear that 
the ‘laic culture’ – that is the vision of law in the sight of non-lawyers – can be utterly different 
from the picture lawyers would like to project inward (toward other lawyers) and outward 
(toward the outside social environment). 
 For demonstrating the concept, let us present here a conceptual analysis of a constituent 
of ‘professional legal culture’, the attorneys’ professional self-image, used in a recent empirical 
study.11 
 To begin with, self-image is interpreted as a cultural phenomenon. It refers to more or 
less objectivised content, which regarding its ontological nature, differs from individual or 
social psychological processes that determine its object of motifs and, therefore, influence 
individual or group behaviour. Consequently, the discourse about attorneys’ self-image must 
be placed into the one about legal culture. In this sense, the self-image of the attorney’s 
profession is viewed as one of the elements of professional legal culture as opposed to lay (non-
lawyer) citizens’ legal culture. The self-image of the profession, however, can be interpreted as 
an ensemble of intellectual elements and content, a tapestry of values, norms, prescriptive 
cultural patterns, narratives, symbols and the sociological patterns can be read out from the 
conduct of the representatives of the profession. 
 Values characteristic of the self-image of the attorney’s profession, such as professional 
preparedness (a high level of legal knowledge), a sense of justice, impartiality and the 
unconditional respect for the interests of the client, belong to the more general values of the 
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broader legal profession and they are embedded in the even more comprehensive values of 
political culture such as liberty, equality and social solidarity. 
 One of the layers of self-image is found closer to the level of social activities and 
comprises the rules of the profession. Part of these rules are “written”, such as the binding rules 
of Act No. XI of 1998 on attorneys or other rules of legal nature such as the codes of conduct 
of the Hungarian Bar Association (hereafter the Bar). The profession has unwritten rules as 
well, including the “courtesy” rules on the interactions with colleagues or lay citizens which 
also form part the profession’s self-image. 
 Descriptive cultural patterns do not prescribe what ought to be done in a particular 
situation, but they set out the positions and competences of the participants. They also designate 
the place and the scope of activities that take place within the society or in the legal sphere. In 
this case, it can be interpreted to include the rules on pleadings and trial organisation laid down 
in the act on civil procedure the recipients of which are primarily judges. They also set forth 
attorneys’ positions and their options to influence the course of an ongoing trial. 
 The values and the layers of prescriptive and descriptive cultural patterns analytically 
separated above are in this case entwined by narratives, stories known and narrated by attorneys. 
They also create the “normative universe” coined by Robert Cover, in which these patterns 
acquire their meaning.12 Every profession has its “great stories”, such as the development of 
the Hungarian attorney’s profession, compactly summarized in the introduction, which is to be 
elaborated and lectured at universities to future attorneys within the discipline of legal history. 
These narratives are coiled around major turning points and outstanding figures of the 
profession as a corporate group and form the basis of the entire professional group. Into these 
narratives are woven the fabric of local “urban legends” and personal stories which inherently 
relate to other cultural fields.13 
 Symbols expressing self-image are not to be construed in their own physical realities 
such as luxury cars, expensive watches, powdered wigs, gowns, the latest version mobile 
phones or state-of-the-art laptops. They are to be interpreted as signs with multiple meanings. 
Symbols can signal the fact of belonging to the in-group and, at the same time, they are able to 
animate complex emotion and knowledge content in outsiders. As for attorneys, status symbols 
bear a major significance, which do not only signal their belonging to the middle class, but they 
also create an impression of success with clients (such as the luxury car or the expensive watch). 
However, other symbols (as it used to be the case with attorney briefcases) distinctly signal 
their owner’s profession. 
 One must also mention the pattern layers inferred from the behaviour of those practising 
the profession which are grouped under tacit knowledge and which are acquired by 
professionals entering the profession through observation of their colleagues’ not so obvious 
activities. These are the tricks of the trade, which can only be mastered in practice and which 
are more often than not markedly different from the idealised values and rules of the 
profession’s manifest self-image. 
 What is important to note here is that contradictions and internal tensions generally arise 
among the above-mentioned elements and layers of self-image in spite of the basic tendency to 
strive for intellectual unity and internal coherence during the formation of the professional self-
image. Presumably, the more coherent and clear the self-image is, the more it can ensure 
cohesion among those practising the profession, which may handsomely contribute to the 
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assertion of interests within professional circles. Conversely, the more contradictory, 
fragmented and vague the self-image of the profession is, the less it will be able to integrate its 
members and the more vulnerable it will become in the face of adversities. The role of a solid 
and clear professional self-image from the point of view of how it has evolved socially is always 
an empirical question: the overly strong corporate spirit may also become a hindrance to react 
adequately to social change. 
 Finally, one must acknowledge the dynamic relation between the self-image of the 
profession and the image created of the profession by lay citizens. The two are mutually 
conversant to set a playing field, which is indispensable for the adjustment to social change or 
the actual inducement thereof. 
 What matters from all the above said in furthering our analysis? First, it is important to 
see that the structure of laic legal culture is similar to the professional, although its normative 
layer is much thinner, and it is rather more fragmented and loaded with more logical 
contradictions. The presence of these two characteristics – the relatively low level of 
knowledge,14 and the existence of logical contradictions in lay views about law15 – was detected 
by the latest legal sociological studies of the Hungarian population, too. However, these 
differences are only gradual – even if they are important –, and they do not touch the basic 
congeniality of these two aspects of legal culture in regard of their constituents, structure and 
fine connective tissue. Consequently, the stories about law are also important in understanding 
laic legal culture. These narratives do not only connect and order the elements of legal culture 
– values, norms, symbols and patterns of social practices –, but also weave the legal culture in 
the texture of the whole culture. 
 So the research program, in which the following tiny stories were recorded, aimed to 
examine the Hungarian population’s legal consciousness.16 In the last period of the project, in 
the autumn of 2016, four focus group interviews were made,17 from which two were recorded 
in Salgótarján and two in Budapest. The material with which we shall work is taken from one 
of the latter two. The interview in question was recorded by video camera in a windowless, 
meeting-room-like premise. It lasted approximately one and a half hours with eight participants 
who were sitting around a long table. The moderator sat at the head of the table with her back 
toward the camera. The script of the interviews ran as follows: after the introduction, the 
moderator asked the participants’ opinion about fare dodgers on public transport; then about 
buying goods of suspicious origin (e.g. goods ‘fallen from a truck’, probably fake or possibly 
stolen); she prompted them to recall their childhood experiences and parental models in relation 
with these; finally, she questioned them about a failed barter deal (somebody asks for the 
maintenance of his new motorcycle by a mechanic in exchange for a good bike). Our research 
group had rather explicit hypotheses about the plausible outcomes of the interviews in this phase 
of the project: nothing good. 
 The inquiries led by Kálmán Kulcsár and András Sajó in the 1970s and ‘80s already 
revealed a peculiar schizophrenia in the Hungarians’ legal mind. This was expressed by the 
following maxim: ‘The law ought to be rigorous, and has to be enforced against everybody – 
except me’.18 Sajó characterized the Hungarians’ relation to law with the ‘hypocrite-parasitic’ 
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attributive in one of his essays after the democratic changes.19 Moreover, György Gajduschek, 
in another study examining the sanction application practice of public administration, drew 
attention to the fact that the message of the authorities’ observed practice was ‘Whoever abides 
the law is stupid’.20 A natural accompany of this schizophrenia was the above-mentioned logical 
inconsistence of views spectacularly exposed by Mihály Berkics’s survey: 73 percent of the 
representative sample simultaneously agreed with the statement ‘Rights are due to only those 
who fulfil their obligations’ and with ‘Certain freedom rights are equally due to everyone’, 
too.21 As György Gajduschek put this in an essay: 
 
All these mirror the citizens’ ‘schizophrenic legal mind’. They do not trust the state and 
law (what they see as a product of the state), but they expect the resolution of all their 
problems from the state. They demand thorough regulations, sanctioning even the least 
of digressions from the rules, strict punishments, however when they have to face the 
law then they may outflank it or require bonitarian treatment. All of this is embedded in 
an unusually pessimistic, cynical and anomic cultural environment.22 
 
In fact, our expectations have been proved true. 
 
3. Niki, Gabi and the others 
 
Meet Gabi and Niki now! 
 ‘I’m Gabi, thirty seven years old. I have been living in Pest for twelve years, and now 
I’m just serving my notice period after quitting my job. And I do massage, outing and biking 
anyway. That’s all.’ 
 ‘I’m Niki, thirty five. I live with my son. I have been working as a credit evaluator for 
two months, but was in banking before. I love doing everything in my spare-time. The range is 
quite wide. I like reading, but also hiking, going to concerts, frolicking, theatre. I try everything 
that’s available.’ 
 Two young ladies, in light summer clothes – we are in the first days of September –, 
sitting side by side on the moderator’s left. Had not we know that they were randomly selected 
into the panel, we would think that they are friends. As the conversation begins warming up 
after getting through the introduction and the topic of fare-dodging, the moderator turns to the 
problem of the ‘fallen off goods’: 
 ‘[…] Suppose that an acquaintance of yours gets a new coat, or a perfume, a mobile 
phone or something else very cheap. So cheap that you may think that this coat or perfume fell 
off a truck, that is, it’s stolen. What do you think about this? Is it acceptable? This is an 
example.’ Whereupon childhood memories descend on Niki: 
 ‘We grew up near Ferencváros transfer station. This meant that all kinds of things quite 
often fell off and everybody living in the housing project worked at the MÁV [Hungarian State 
Railways] or had some relatives there given that the project was built for railway workers. 
Things very often fell off. And quite good things sometimes. At that time [when everybody 
wanted to buy] Hi-fi sets, Tvs, jogging suits, specifically everything. And the MÁV workers too 
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thought, of course, that they were working for very little money, so something fell off at every 
stop, but there is no steady demand for railway transportation anymore today either, it’s been 
considerably fading away. A lot of things fell off at every stop, and then some people got in 
trouble with the police. But, really, why would one pay ten, twenty or no matter how many 
grands for something that could be bought for two. And it is original or good.’ 
 A round later in the conversation, the moderator questions about the influence of social 
environment. 
 ‘If acquaintances or friends buy these kinds of goods, to your mind, does it influence 
one’s decision in this case?’ – the question throws Niki back into memories again. 
 ‘It just worked that way for us then and the products kept coming, and specifically 
everybody did that way. Thus, nobody thought of buying a Hi-fi set in the shop when it was 
delivered for half or three quarter of the price. And this was quite normal. Shouldn’t think on 
extreme poverty anyway for we had cars and spent our holyday by the seaside. We weren’t so 
lowlifes. But this was the normal, the accepted and everybody lived this way there. That if there 
was something then from there. The Hi-fi set wasn’t vital, of course, we simply bought it there 
and that was it.’ 
 Then in the finish of the interview, just before leaving, when the moderator questions 
what has been the most interesting for each of the participants – We’ve arrived at the end of this 
conversation more or less, nevertheless I would like to ask another round to summarise your 
opinion about what you’ve found the most interesting.’ – Niki suddenly ‘comes out’ (as popular 
media calls this kind of announcements nowadays): 
 I’m ashamed now, because I feel a bit that everybody tries to be very honest. [...] I don’t 
know, but it seems to me that way from the conversation, yet I used to grab these possibilities, 
let’s call them that, even in administration for example. I’ve a lot of connections everywhere, 
so that’s my way to use them and this is the most natural thing for me, and I used to wag too 
when I need to do it. Obviously not when I’m in a new job and rolling in money, for I buy it [the 
ticket] then. And I too teach my child to be honest, and he never wags fare-dodging anyway, 
because he’s a bit of square, so he seems to be a bit too stiff with these regulations to me. I like 
that a bit in him, but I’m not so honest. And I tell you that I feel ashamed of myself anyway.’ 
 One question only before we turn to Gabi’s story, setting aside any kind of popular 
psychology: how much might Niki really feel ashamed of herself? 
 Let us hear, however, Gabi’s story now which is a reflection of Niki’s from many points 
of view. Interestingly, it begins at the end, with an adolescence memory called forth by the 
following question of the moderator: ‘Let’s move to the next topic now. Did it occur in your 
childhood that somebody in your environment or you yourself or anybody else lifted a roll, 
chocolate, bun or something else in a shop. What happened to her? Was she caught and 
accounted for or what? To which Gabi: ‘It happened every day that the others stole. The 
college. Doesn’t matter. I said ok, I ought to do it too. I went in the shop for a [box of] milk, I 
was so much of a looser. And it didn’t come from inside, but from the need to belong somewhere, 
doing the same as them, so I tried to steal one, but they caught me, of course. I felt it bloody 
embarrassing because I didn’t really want to do it. But it didn’t matter, they said that I shouldn’t 
come there ever again behaving like this. I said OK, and I thought through this “follow the 
others” thing again. Moderator: ‘Did the shopkeeper grab you then? Gabi: There was no visible 
sign of what we were talking about. She just accosted me, I told her that it was OK, she was 
right, I gave it back to her and went off, she went aside. There was no humiliation in the story.’ 
 However, after several comments, the moderator’s next question – And how was it 
within your family – I asked this already, you just haven’t answered yet.’ – pushes Gabi further 
who gets a kind of sincerity attack: ‘Bloody good question! I saw my parents stealing. So we 
went to the shop, I was only a kid and saw them put something away and I felt awful. I don’t 
know why I have become so different or how it’s working. For I simply saw in my mind that it 
would be fucking sticky if they were nabbed. They weren’t caught, of course. I just learned from 
this, from that I felt uneasy seeing this. That it’s no course for me.’ 
 Let us take a closer look into the two stories once again! How should we understand that 
the two stories are the reflections of each other? Niki’s narrative begins in the past and ends in 
the present: fencing is not a problem to me, since I grew up in such circumstances in which this 
was common, and I make use of every sensible opportunity even nowadays, indeed, I try to 
guide my son in this direction. Gabi’s story starts in the present and moves toward the past: I 
am honest, because I was already caught on a petty mischief once in my adolescence since I 
was a looser then. For I had seen my parents stealing in my childhood, and the fear of being 
nabbed had already been fixated in my mind. 
 Niki and shame: I am not afraid to tell that I am not honest, because honesty is not 
enough for ‘surviving’ – street smart is what is needed. In fact, I am not ashamed of not being 
honest; indeed, I wish that my son were not too much either. Gabi and shame: actually, I am 
ashamed because being honest is lame. I am honest, in fact, only because I am scared of being 
caught. I was scared already in my childhood when I saw my parents stealing at the shop. 
 Niki and sincerity: I’m not sincere, of course – I do not feel ashamed at all for breaching 
stupid regulations when I need to. Do not think about me, however, that I do not consider 
honesty important while you play innocent. Gabi and sincerity: I am really afraid of breaching 
the rules therefore I am really honest, although I know it is lame. 
 The acceptance of honesty – the virtue of following the rules (be them moral or ethical 
ones) for their own value – driven by feigned shame or fear meant its subordination in both 
cases. In the former case, to the hypocritically ashamed (self-consciously taken, in fact) 
‘common sense’, while in the latter, to the sincerely ashamed ‘irrational fear’. 
 However, if we emerge from the thermal bath of academic moralism – what Richard 
Posner may highly approve23 – and step on the dry land of Hungarian socio-legal studies, then 
we could see that the researchers have picked up on another common denominator of Gabi’s 
and Niki’s stories already in the middle of the 1970s. Namely the influence of social 
environment (and practice), that is, the influence of ‘others’. This effect has been named  
‘normalisation’ – forgetting or setting aside the well-known Roman law concept of desuetudo 
–, when the normative effect of social practice derogates law’s normativity. For example, only 
43 percent of the Hungarian population were inclined to punish minor theft at workplace, while 
11 percent did not express any kind of disapproval at that time. 
 
4. Legal storytelling as literature 
 
If we are looking for legal stories, then we can see that Hungarian jurisprudence has not paid 
much attention yet to narratives told about law. The underlying cause of this might not be the 
late and fragmented reception of ‘law and literature’ formed in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
For the delay is not long, only two decades, and as for the fragmentation – and the actual lack 
of dealing with legal narratives –, it is rather the result of a deeper theoretical current defining 
Hungarian legal thinking. Namely, the legal positivism taken shape in the first part of the 20th 
century24 which primarily sees rules in the law’s phenomenon, eminently the positive legal rules 
                                                             
23 Considering Posner describes academic moralism as ‘A lot of it strikes me as prissy, hermetic, censorious, naive, 
sanctimonious, self-congratulatory, too far Left or too far Right, and despite its frequent political extremism, rather 
insipid.’ Richard A. POSNER: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. 111 Harvard Law Review (1998) 7 
1637–1717. 1640.   
24 About how positivism formed and gained hegemony in Hungarian legal thinking in the first part of the 20th 
century see József SZABADFALVI: Hungarian Legal Philosophical Thinking: From the Beginnings to the mid-20th 
Century In: Shemshushenko, U S; Boshycky, U L; Denysov, V N; Chernecka, O V; Levkivska, G P (eds.) IV 
Науков читання присвяченi пам’ятi Володомира Михайловича Корецького: Збiрник наукових праць. Kiev, 
issued and enforced by the state. This peculiar narrowed perspective prevented, for example, 
Hungarian legal ethnology to study everyday life stories about law though ethnographers 
probably met regiments of this kind of stories on the field.25 Instead of that they tried to 
reconstruct – using the term ‘construct’ may be more adequate here – the rules of custom and 
folk law leaning on carefully prepared questionnaires.26 
 So we have to cast our watchful eyes on literature! This is true even if the recent high-
impact legal story – raising attention both among lawyers and (film) critics – has been published 
by Elemér Magyar, an attorney in Eger. However, considering the fact that Magyar, who had 
written a drama on the basis of the files of Dénes Pusoma’s criminal case, retired to be a fulltime 
writer soon after the premier of the film adaptation, Magyar’s case hardly questions the above 
statement.27  
 Hungarian classic literature abounds in legal stories, of course, beginning with János 
Arany’s ballads to the novels of Dezső Kosztolányi and Géza Csáth, which have been analysed 
by the scholars interested in ‘law and literature’ for an antidote to the dryness of legal 
curriculum. Anna Kiss’s work has been ground-breaking in this respect whose first book’s, used 
also in legal education, title is quite eloquent: Literary Heroes Who Committed Crimes.28 Yet 
even more so is of the legal instruments chrestomathy, serving as material for complex practical 
training in criminal law and for preparation on the bar exam, which she edited, coordinating the 
work of a populous scholarly community: Crimes from the Library-room.29 This latter title 
especially hints at the Hungarian lawyers’ attitude expressing that they prefer to turn to 
literature rather than to ordinary people when they are seeking legal stories. 
 However, this may not necessarily be true only for Hungarian lawyers: on the one hand, 
we have seen the scruples formulated in American jurisprudence against ‘legal storytelling’ 
and, on the other hand, like their overseas – or over-Elbe – colleagues, the Hungarians too 
incline to look beyond their own national literature, and select stories from the inexhaustible 
storage of world literature. At this point we arrive at Franz Kafka’s works that have a key 
importance in our inquiries. Partly because they thematically join together the Hungarian and 
the international ‘law and literature’ studies, and partly for Kafka’s aesthetics can help us – as 
we hope – to shed light on certain features of Hungarian legal culture. 
 The notoriously most renowned ‘Kafka-logist’ in Hungarian ‘law in literature’, Tamás 
Nagy, identifies three interpretations of Kafka’s works.30 Two out of them closely linked, 
embedded into the same polemics – the so-called ‘Posner-debate’31 –, while the third one is 
                                                             
Ukrajna: Kyiv University of Law (Київський Yніверситет права), 2011. 49–75. József SZABADFALVI: The Role 
of Bódog Somló in the Revival of Hungarian Legal Philosophy. 93 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
(2007) 4, 540-550. 
25 There are always exceptions, e.g. see Zsuzsanna LANCZENDORFER: Gyilkosságból népköltészet. Helyi 
népballadák a jogtörténet szolgálatában [Folk poetry from murder. Local ballads in service of legal history]. In: 
Balázs FEKETE, István H. SZILÁGYI, Anna KISS, Zsolt ZŐDI (eds.): Iustitia körülnéz. Budapest, Szent István 
Társulat, 2017. 117–129.   
26 Cf. Szabina BOGNÁR: A népi jogélet kutatása Magyarországon [Legal ethnography in Hungary]. Budapest, 
Magyar Néprajzi Társaság, 2016.    
27 See István H. SZILÁGYI: There Is No Mercy. 56 Acta Juridica Hungarica, (2015) 1, 86–107. 
28 Anna KISS: Bűnbe esett irodalmi hősök [Literary heroes who committed crimes]. Budapest, Publicitás–
ArtMédia Kft., 2009. 
29 Kiss Anna (szerk.): Bűntények a könyvtárszobából [Crimes from the library-room]. Budapest, CompLex, 
2010. 
30 Cf. Tamás NAGY: Néhány eljárás: Kafka-olvasatok a jogirodalomban [Several processes: Kafka-readings in 
legal literature].  In: NAGY, supra note 3.  85–123. 
31 The heated debate, which sometimes did not go without personal insults, lasted for years and certainly has made 
up an autonomous chapter in the history of ‘law and literature’. Nearly all the leading scholars of the field took 
part in it including the challenged Posner himself. Just to mention here several names and contributions in 
chronological order for an illustration: Robin WEST: Authority, Autonomy and Choice. The Role of Consent in 
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner. 99 Harvard Law Review (1985) 384, 385–
only loosely related to that context. Robin West’s keynote thesis is that the picture drawn about 
human condition by liberal economics – the homo economicus – is too simplistic. Thus, it too 
easily identifies the nature of consent based on free choice – which morally justifies the free 
market and the liberal legal order – with the motive of wealth-maximisation leaning on rational 
deliberation. West uses Kafka’s novels to reveal that the consent of a party sometimes arises 
from the ‘freedom of submission’, which can be destructive in both a moral and a material sense 
however.32 
 Posner’s aim is not simply to refute West’s Kafka interpretation then again, but to 
question Kafka’s works’ – and thereby generally literature’s – legal relevancy. In order to do 
this, he emphasises primarily that Kafka’s ideas about human nature and his feeling of life is 
nothing but the projection of his own neurosis and personal historical position that has nothing 
to do with the modern American life.33 From this point of view, The Trial is not more either 
than merely a ‘sick Kafkaesque joke’.34 
 Theodor Ziolokwski, whom Posner mentions in a note, but otherwise leaves him out of 
consideration in fact, elaborates the third interpretation.35 This omission is no wonder, for 
Ziolkowski – unlike West and Posner who rather use Kafka’s short stories such as In the Penal 
Colony, The Judgement or A Hunger Artist – concentrates on the analysis of The Trial. 
According to Ziolkowski, the novel can be read in the context of the professional discussion on 
the contemporary reform of Austrian penal law in which Kafka himself was an interested 
participant. More precisely, the novel can be seen as a critical reflection on the current penal 
regime tending towards an absurd burlesque. This aspect of the text might be evident to Kafka’s 
contemporaries. As Tamás Nagy points out evoking a biographical anecdote ‘[…] according to 
which, when Kafka first read out the first chapter of the novel in his companionship – among 
whom not one them was a lawyer like his friend, for example, Max Brod – he had to stop from 
time to time since he could not continue the reading for the big laugh.36 
  Each of these above presented, partly contradictory, interpretations contains elements 
that are worth considering. West is probably right about that the ‘freedom of submission’, 
apprehended by Kafka, is indeed a real psychological factor that can affect the work of law. 
Ziolkowski, in turn, rightly sees that Kafka’s feeling of life has more direct relation to the reality 
of law’s life than this abstract, psychological circumstantiality. We must not brush aside 
Posner’s insight either, which may seem to be superfluous at first sight: it is possible that the 
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32 WEST: ibid. 
33 POSNER: Law and Literature (1998), 199. 
34 POSNER: ibid. 135. 
3535 Theodor ZIOLKOWSKI: Franz Kafka: The Trial. In: Theodor ZIOLKOWSKI: Dimensions of the Modern Novels: 
Germen Texts and European Contexts. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967. 37–67. Theodor 
Ziolkowski: The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crisis. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1997. 
36 NAGY: ibid. 114. 
whole Kafkaesque ‘sick joking’ somehow belongs to the spirit of the place and age in fact. 
Ziolkowski would keenly agree: this spirit is not American, nor modern (or ‘post-modern’ or 
whatever we call the contemporary Zeitgeist). However, for digging deeper, it is inevitable to 
look into the nature of the Kafkaesque ‘sick joking’, that is into the aesthetic program on which 
Kafka’s oeuvre is built, which can be best grasped by the concept of ‘absurd’ in turn. 
  If we are to understand the aesthetic working of ‘absurd’, it is enough to take Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis for an example. It is evidently impossible that one awakes on a morning finding 
himself transformed into a bug. However, this nonsense does not seem to embarrass anybody, 
including the protagonist of the story, except for the reader. Nevertheless, the absurd does not 
work only with effects drawn from tensions of cognitive contradictions. Then this would not be 
more exciting for the reader than a well-formulated logical trap37 or paradox, for example: what 
happens when the irresistible force meets an unsurmountable obstacle? Absurd calls forth 
ambivalent emotions too. For example, the reader of the Metamorphosis may be adrift between 
empathy, commiseration and compassion on the one hand, and disgust, despite and rejection on 
the other hand. In the centre of the aesthetic impact stands the precipitation of the feeling of 
incapacity in fact. The reader is unable to understand the story and identify himself with the 
protagonist, yet he cannot reject him either. What the reader experiences is nothing but this 
inability. Géza Páskándi accurately expresses this in one of his essays writing that we could 
glimpse in the heroes of the absurd literature ‘[…] the people who are standing unarmed in face 
of the situation, not capable to choose or make a decision’.38 
 The feeling of incapacity, in turn, stands only a step away from the ‘freedom of 
submission’, the acquiescence in moral and physical destruction. As Páskándi aptly phrases this 
in another writing: ‘Thus for the man, absurd is that carries its own ineluctability in its 
contingency: it is law and necessity in its fortuitousness. It is such a “coincidence” which has 
smuggled itself in the Pantheon of necessities to show itself as real god. The essence of absurd 
phenomenon is the chance that camouflages itself as ineluctability and law to our mind. 
Therefore the prototype and the source of absurd is: the death.’39 
 Casting a glance on the history of literature is enough to see that Posner is right in that 
the ‘sick joking’ and the ‘freedom of submission’ are not American inventions at all. For the 
homeland and primary hotbed of absurd lays in Middle Europe. That is why Kafka and the 
outstanding writers of the following generations – Rózewicz, Mrožek, Hrabal, Okudzsava – 
‘[…] flirt with absurd and make the conditions of the region look like a living nonsense. After 
all, people live, are born, love, and die here too, yet as if this place would be an enchanted 
garden in which everything stands on its head, and the inhabitants hardly notice this’.40 
 
5. Embarrassing stories and the absurdity of everyday life 
 
Now, we have arrived at the last of our problems indicated in the introduction. What are the 
similarities between Kafka’s writings and our story scraps, and what are the differences? The 
essence of their similarity is easily recognisable already in the light of the above said: it lays in 
their absurdity. The more intriguing part of the question is to reveal their differences. Looking 
for an answer, we should consider the circumstances of the writings’ birth first, that is, cast a 
glance on the author’s social position. 
                                                             
37 See e.g. Joseph Heller’s Catch-22.  
38 Géza PÁSKÁNDI: Gondolatok az abszurd fogalmáról [Thoughts about the concept of absurd]. Korunk, 1967/6. 
834–839. 
39 Géza PÁSKÁNDI: Az „abszurd jelenség” és a halál [The ‘absurd phenomenon’ and the death]. Korunk, 1969/2. 
167–171. 171. 
40 Miklós ALMÁSI: Anti-esztétika. Séták a művészetfilozófiák labirintusában [Anti-aesthetics. Walks in the 
labyrinth of art-philosophies]. Budapest, T-Twins – Lukács archívum, 1992. 224. [Italics in the original.] 
Kafka, as a middle-class offspring, graduated in law and worked as a lawyer until the 
end of his life. He had moderately radical – anti-clerical, pacifist – political views, and, well, 
had some problems with the fair sex (to be fair: who has not had any problem with some kind 
of sex?). After he had been diagnosed with tuberculosis, he took his illness seriously and tried 
to spend more time in fresh air. All in all, he lived a normal ‘bourgeois’ life – except that he 
obsessively wrote at nights. However, the questions of who was doing what in their night-time 
solitude was not counted among the criteria of normality to Kafka’s contemporaries. 
Why is this interesting? For it is evident that – notwithstanding the tensions salient from 
his insecure political and sexual identity and his spiritual sensibility – Kafka needed a great deal 
of artistic creativity to write his stories. On the other hand, our contemporary legal storytellers 
are the protagonists of their own stories. In other words: what was fiction by Kafka is reality 
today. In more lengthy wordings: it seems that Kafka’s absurd nightmares slowly became 
reality during the past hundred years. What does this mean and how could it happen? Let us see 
a ‘literary’ example first! Read carefully this text below dated 3 November 1959!                 
  ‘István Örkény has belonged to the group of right-wing writers within the Writers’ 
Association since 1953. He was elected as a member of the Writers’ Association’s presidency, 
and the editorial committee of the Literary Paper in the autumn of 1956. He has agreed with 
the counter-revolutionary line of action of these organisations. He looked with favour on the 
movement started at 23th October 1956, and, for supporting it, he wrote and read out the 
‘Obsecration for Budapest’ in the Radio, and published it in the newspaper titled ‘Truth’. He 
also wrote the infamous counter-revolutionary calumniation titled “We lied at day, we lied at 
night’ as the introduction to the Free Kossuth Radio’s broadcastings. After 4 November 1956, 
he has actively taken part in the ‘Revolutionary Committee’ of Writers’ Association, and he has 
approved its working. In the company of Tibor Déry, Géza Képes and Áron Tamási, he took 
part in the informative meeting with Krishna Mennon, Indian ambassador in December 1956. 
He actively took part in the preparatory works of the Writers’ Association meeting at 28 
December 1956, and of the resolutions issued by it. After suspending the autonomy of Writers’ 
Association, he has continued his inimical activity: he has been among the organisers of the 
writers’ strike, and the boycott of the Literary Committee at the time of its formation. Örkény’s 
opinion and behaviour has not changed until recently. He has not been capable, and has not 
wanted to face and admit his faults; consequently, he has excluded himself from Hungarian 
literature. On grounds of the above said, we do not propose to issue a driving licence to István 
Örkény.’41 
 If we take a ‘scientific’ approach to the problem now, via the above presented 
contemporary socio-legal studies on legal consciousness of Hungarian population and legal 
culture, then we may again refer to György Gajduschek’s insights on the underlying causes of 
Hungarian legal culture’s chaotic and confused character: 
 
Six different political regimes have dominated in Hungary in the past century […]. 
There are some similarities among most of these regimes. The most obvious, though 
paradoxical, similarity is that their legitimizing ideology was always founded on the 
harsh denial of the previous one. […] Most of these regimes, except for the 1990–2010 
period, had authoritarian features or had a totalitarian nature. The legitimacy of each 
regimes was mostly not based on free elections, on a democratic arrangement, or on 
high level of welfare for the people. Instead, these regimes relied on actively spread 
ideologies that proclaimed the superiority of the given regime in various respects and 
served as major legitimizing forces. […] The end-result of this that the footprints of 
                                                             
41 Jelentés Örkény István gépkocsivezetői engedélyéről [Report on István Örkény’s driving licence]. Rubicon 
15/8–9. (2004) 76. Quoted by NAGY: supra, 183. Nagy aptly notices that had we not known that this is a police 
document, we would think it is one of Örkény’s own ‘one-minute’ stories. 
official ideologies have continuously present in citizens’ mind. However, these 
ideologies have been inherently contradicting. As they were inculcated in an 
unconscious and unreflective manner, the contradictions do not cause mental problems 
in everyday life.42 
 
Well, this confused mind-set may be mentally manageable on the outset except that it easily 
makes everyday life absurd and anathematizes contemporary Hungarians to taste its bitterness 
constantly. 
 Finally, sinking again in the warm thermal bath of academic moralism, let us wave 
farewell to the Dear Reader quoting István Bibó, the greatest Hungarian political and moral 
philosopher of the past century: 
 
Evil, paltriness, and cowardice consist not in any free and dauntingly devilish choice 
but in the very fact that we wretchedly, unconsciously, and without free choice do and 
only do what our social, community, educational and personal characteristics, warped 
and warping experiences, ingrained biases, meaningless platitudes, and comfortable and 
foolish formulas dispose us to do. […] It is in this context that we have to raise the issue 
of our own, our nation’s, and our society’s responsibility. If Hungarian society is indeed 
a serf-minded and herd-wise one that dumps the issues of responsibility on its masters 
and occupiers, there is no point in raising the question; it will reject it. But I do not 
believe Hungarian society was or is so deeply lost in this herd-mindedness and in being 
downtrodden.43 
 




In the introduction, we have seen the doubts concerning the genre of ‘legal storytelling’ raised 
by both lawyers and literati. This essay argues against these scruples using the material of focus 
group interviews taken from a recent research on Hungarians’ legal consciousness revealing the 
important role these everyday life stories play in legal culture. 
 It takes the analysis of the attorneys’ professional self-image as a starting point to 
explore the elements, structure and the dynamics of legal culture emphasising that narratives 
do not only connect and order the elements of legal culture – values, norms, symbols and 
patterns of social practices –, but weave the legal culture in the texture of the whole culture. 
The discussion progresses from this general level to highlighting more specific characteristics 
of Hungarian legal culture. The alarming symptoms of legal alienation and norm-confusions 
set the background for the empirical studies from which some everyday legal stories have been 
assorted. 
 The stories of Gabi and Niki have accurately reflected these problems. The acceptance 
of honesty – the virtue of following the rules (be them moral or ethical ones) for their own value 
– driven by feigned shame or fear meant its subordination in both cases. In the former case, to 
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DÉNES (ed): The Art of Peacemaking. Political Essays by István Bibó. New Haven & London, Yale University 
Press, 2015. 233–354. 258–259.   
the hypocritically ashamed (self-consciously taken, in fact) ‘common sense’, while in the latter, 
to the sincerely ashamed ‘irrational fear’. 
 At this point, Franz Kafka’s works were introduced for understanding more deeply the 
overall cultural context in which Hungarian legal culture is embedded. From the synthesis of 
three different readings of Kafka – Robin West’s, Richard Posner’s and Theodore Ziolkowski’s 
– the aesthetical concept of ‘absurd’ has emerged as a key notion clipping together everyday 
life and the literary narrations. 
 Seeking the differences between everyday life and literary stories has led us to consider 
the historical process that has turned absurd fiction into reality in Middle Europe and more 
particularly in Hungary. An official police document and some scholarly notes have been used 
to shed light on the nature of this phenomenon. 
 In conclusion, we have to point out that this essay can be seen as an intuitive theoretical 
experiment for using aesthetic notions in analysing empirical sociological data rather than a 
methodologically well-founded application of that. The basic idea of this experiment is that 
both law and aesthetics are permeated and cross-infected by moral, and social-psychological 
constituents. This is why the phenomena of these two cultural fields permanently resonate to 
each other. A great deal of philosophical, aesthetical research and qualitative empirical data is 
needed to ground this method sufficiently. Nevertheless, we hope that this attempt can stand as 
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